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Project Alliances in Australasia – Differences with other Forms of 
Relationship Based Procurement  
Abstract 
Project alliancing for the delivery of Australasian infrastructure and construction 
projects is a growing form of project procurement. Project alliancing differs from other 
forms of alliancing in the business sector between entities that form real or quasi joint 
ventures in an alliance to jointly deliver products such as aircraft, military assets, or 
information technology products. The purpose of this paper is to highlight how project 
alliancing as it currently exists in the Australasian context significantly varies from 
other relationship-based project procurement forms.  
The paper extends our knowledge and understanding of this particular alliancing form. 
The value of this paper lies in its currency in capturing of the lived experience of 
alliance team members through the rich insights gathered from those intimately 
involved in them.  
The implications of reported results on project management practice is that it highlights 
key defining cultural ambience differences between these alliances and other types 
relationship-based project procurement forms that need to be understood by all 
participants to facilitate project success. 
1 Introduction 
Relationship-based project procurement has been a growing trend in the Australasian 
region with many projects embracing partnering approaches, use of public private 
partnerships (PPPs) as well as project alliances. There has been much confusion among 
practitioners, clients and the academic community about some fundamental, as well as 
subtle, differences between the various forms of relational-based project procurement. It 
would therefore be valuable for these communities to have an authoritative source with 
which to refer when considering project procurement options. We aim to provide that 
facility through this paper. 
The research question that this paper addresses, relating to the Australasian construction 
and engineering context, is: 
What are the defining differences between alliancing and other forms of 
collaborative project procurement?  
The term alliance, or ally, originally coming from the Latin through French to English, 
is commonly connected with military operations where cooperation with another is 
sought for a particular purpose, though it may also relate to other forms of association 
for a specific purpose including those between companies (e.g. The New Oxford 
Dictionary, 2001and New World Dictionary, 1976). As with the use of all terms, when 
placed in a different context and as a natural consequence of change over time, the 
meaning it takes on may alter. Because there seems some confusion as to what a project 
alliance is, and in particular the shape and form it has come to take in the Australasian 
project management field where alliance agreements are now common for major 
infrastructure and construction projects, this paper endeavours to clearly define what a 
project alliance is. Further, where this clearly described form of project team formation 
may best be used to advantage is then explained and reasoned.  
We draw upon results from two recent studies of alliancing in Australasia during late 
2010. One study (predominantly focussing on Australian cases) was on the current state 
of alliancing in Australasia (Mills and Harley, 2010) and the other investigation was our 
study on the attraction, recruitment, development and retention of alliance managers. 
One of our aims in that study was to better understand the significant differences 
between project alliances and other relationship-based forms of project based 
procurement. We found that project alliances in general are formed in response to a felt 
need by project owners to deal with fundamental uncertainty relating to the nature of the 
proposed project and to share risk and uncertainty. This was especially evident in terms 
of the project scoping and briefing stage and at the project realisation stage for 
inherently complex projects.  
Traditional forms of procurement follow a linear path of problem definition, design 
brief, tendering, negotiation with successful contractor and then project delivery. The 
project owner usually has enough knowledge of what is needed to be able to effectively 
brief a designer, make an effective assessment of bids and then to leave the details of 
project delivery to the design team and project realisation contractor. In construction 
and similar project types where producing a tangible outcome such as a building, or a 
ship or engineering infrastructure is involved a design-bid-build format (Masterman, 
2002) is usual but it could also follow a design and construction (D&C) package 
approach where the D&C entity responds to performance brief and specifications 
documentation. However, such approaches assume that the project owner (PO) and/or 
that owner’s representative (POR) does not need to engage closely with the project team 
realising the project. They do not participate in detailed discussions about the design 
development or the realisation process in terms of delivery timing of phases/stages or 
elements of the project nor do they work closely with the PO and/or POR in developing 
various options to consider once the project contracts have been settled. Traditionally, if 
the POR wants that level of control then a cost plus form of procurement is often 
agreed, but traditional project procurement forms tend to result in an asymmetry and 
linearity of information, expertise and power. At the initial project phase the PO or POR 
tends to be ‘in control’ and at the realisation phase the delivery/realisation contractor 
tends to take the initiative based on instructions and delivers what was agreed to based 
on a highly transactional approach. Any equal negotiation or joint exploration between 
POR and delivery contractor tends to be very limited. This can be contrasted to a 
relationship approach in which the POR often works with the non-owner participants 
(NOPs), such as design teams and the delivery contractor, in a more collaborative 
manner where advice is sought by the POR of NOPs about options on project design 
and delivery decisions. There are a number of well known and understood options of 
relationship-based project procurement and these will be discussed at length in Section 
2.2 of this paper. The form that is the focus of this paper is project alliancing.     
Wood and Duffield, commenting on alliancing projects, state that “Public and private 
sector expenditure on infrastructure projects in the Australian road, rail and water 
sectors has grown significantly from 2003 to 2009, increasing from $12 billion per 
annum in the 2003 to 2004 financial year to $32 billion per annum in the 2008 to 2009 
financial year”  (2009: p7). This scale of alliancing and its popularity within Australia is 
corroborated by two recent reports (Blismas and Harley, 2008; Mills and Harley, 2010). 
Clearly, project alliancing is an important procurement option available to POs amongst 
the cluster of relationship-based project procurement options and it is important to be 
clear about why one option may be preferable to another.    
We propose seven themes emerging from our data that substantially explain the 
difference between project alliancing and other forms of relationship-based 
procurement. A critical principle of difference is that of alliance participants sharing 
pain or gain whilst holding an holistic view of project success. In this form of 
relationship-based procurement project success incorporates more than financial bottom 
line measures and short term impact results for those considered important project 
stakeholders. This is one of several factors that distinguish project alliances (Pas) from 
partnering, PPPs, and other forms of relationship based procurement. While the 
question of what it is like to work within a PA is interesting and was addressed by our 
research, we also found the more fundamental issue of clearly stating the difference 
between a PA and its related forms of project procurement was important. Indeed there 
are minor nuances and differences under the PA umbrella that are worthy of another 
paper that concentrates on explaining these terms in relation to how they may influence 
the ambience (mood, feeling and sense of atmosphere) of the organisations (project 
alliance entities) generated by these procurement arrangements.     
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Next we outline some of the salient 
literature to enable us to answer the research question posed earlier in this section. This 
is followed by an explanation of the research approach adopted in the study partially 
reported upon in this paper. We then present findings followed by discussion of the 
findings and their implications for the project management (PM) discipline. The paper 
concludes with a summary of the paper. 
2 Salient Literature 
In this section we first discuss the project context that may lead to the types of 
complexity that prompt use of a project alliance. In Section 1 we stated that traditional 
transactional procurement forms tend to be adopted where the PO or POR sees little 
value in engaging with the contracting parties given the task of project delivery. 
Relationship-based contracting, however, has developed in response to the PO realising 
that knowledge held by NOPs is vital and needs to be combined with the PO’s (or 
POR’s) knowledge of the project’s benefit to be realised in order to achieve a more 
effective project solution. This presents a challenge to the traditional procurement 
approach because is creates a ‘chicken and egg’ paradox. PORs need interaction with 
the NOPs to develop a design brief and project realisation plan that is effective and 
capitalises upon innovation and smart ideas that the NOPs can deliver but under the 
traditional transactional approach they cannot access this knowledge and expertise until 
they are contracted. Any change in the project brief will then require re-work, 
compensation for changes in what was contracted for and disruption to project delivery. 
Even with a cost-plus procurement option, where profit is added to expended costs, the 
POR often is placed in a vulnerable position—either by an asymmetry of power and 
information working against effective collaboration or through the incentive to NOPs to 
maximise cost and thus their profit. 
A more open and truly collaborative solution to this paradox is to engage in a 
relationship-based procurement approach which means engaging the NOPs under a 
form of cost plus that protects the PO against exploitation.  
2.1 Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)  
A PO always pays both a direct and indirect price for getting others to deliver their 
project. Any make-or-buy decision that results in outsourcing work in any procurement 
form generally results in fragmentation of interest. Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 
(1997) discuss the concept of stewardship in the context of agency theory. Basically, 
they argue that traditionally agency theory assumes that when an entity (person or 
organisation) decides to commission some other entity to act on their behalf to procure 
something that an inherent conflict of interest presents itself. Owners become principals 
when they decide to contract an agent to do something for them. According to agency 
theory, once there is a separation in identity from principal and agent two repercussions 
inevitably follow.  
First, there is an imperfect understanding of the requirement because the principal can 
never fully explain what is required. However explicit the instructions may be there are 
always implicit assumptions made on the part of the principal making it impossible for 
the agent to ever be fully clear as to what was requested. In PM terms this takes place 
during the briefing process and so a highly skilled and effective agent is a person who 
can best elicit, refine, re-frame instructions and confirm meaning so that there is as 
small a gap as possible between the explicit and implicit instructions. In complex 
projects, alliancing is a favoured option, as in this procurement approach an agent’s 
superb skills in empathic appreciation (Leonard and Rayport, 1997; Parker, Atkins and 
Axtell, 2008) of the principal are crucially important and available. This is supported by 
the trust, commitment and authentic behaviour that are present in alliance project 
agreements and interactions.  
Second, agency theory views agents and principals as being in a win-lose struggle 
where the asymmetry of knowledge, information, power and motivation for an outcome 
leads to a hidden but real struggle between parties to gain advantage. The principal is 
hoping to get the agent to perform to the agent’s agenda and vice versa. To overcome 
this tendency, governance structures need to be put in place to protect both parties from 
exploitation.  
The underlying procurement principle is that there is a transaction cost for gaining 
access to valuable knowledge, insights and expertise held by NOPs. At one end of the 
contractual spectrum a PO can pay for the cost of tendering, all re-work, and 
negotiations relating to contract changes in a highly contestable traditional form of 
procurement. At the other end of this spectrum the PO can pay up-front for expertise 
and co-development of the project and reduce the cost of tendering and any overall 
negotiations over changes to original agreed plans. This issue revolves around agency 
transaction costs. 
The well known concept of transaction cost economics (TCE) comes to us from the 
economics literature (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985;1993). Any transaction 
incurs a cost: tendering involves costs for both the owner as they search for suitable 
tenderers and tenderers as they bear the  cost of tendering; monitoring and contracts 
administration involves cost; changing project specifications and scope can result in 
waste and re-work cost. Any governance cost of using a relationship-based approach, in 
which the focus on the NOP’s expertise and knowledge is paramount over lowest cost 
project tender, must be compared to the value represented by the quality of decision 
making as well as the likelihood of a reduction in costs incurred for re-work and 
contract management, including dispute costs over contract changes.  
We need, therefore, to include discussion of collaborative forms of relationship-based 
project procurement in terms of the access given to POs and PORs to exceptional 
expertise and responsiveness so that the project context rationale for using a 
relationship-based project procurement approach is clear. Only then can we discuss 
some of the underlying concepts that explain when, where and how project alliancing 
may be a superior option to other forms of relationship-based procurement. This will 
require additional discussion of the antecedents to collaboration such as trust and 
commitment. 
2.2 The Project Context 
Infrastructure and engineering projects were suggested by Turner and Cochrane (1993) 
to typically have well understood goals and methods of delivery. However their 
attempts at project classification on that basis appear to be rather coarse-grained when 
contrasted with the added dimension of project type offered by others (Shenhar and 
Dvir, 2004; Shenhar, Milosevic, Dvir and Thamhain, 2007) who consider novelty, 
complexity, technology and pace as important project context considerations. Howell 
Windahl and Seidel (2010) have classified PM frameworks and approaches based upon 
two dimensions of uncertainty (the probability of unexpected events) and consequences 
(the impact or cost of the unexpected). Projects have also been more recently perceived 
in terms of complex bundles of projects and associated services where innovation and 
learning features strongly (Hobday, 1998; Brady and Davies, 2004; Davies and Hobday, 
2005). These examples indicate relevance of issues of project complexity, degree of 
being inherently complicated or their being delivered in a turbulent or chaotic 
environment. 
This leads us to view projects in terms of what is known and unknown i.e. risk and 
uncertainty. The Johari window, originally developed by Luft and Ingham (1955) is a 
tool to map awareness. Its dimensions are ‘known to self’ and ‘known to others’. Public
knowledge is that which is known to self and others. Private knowledge is known to 
self but unknown by others. Blind is known to others but not to self and unknown is 
knowledge that neither ‘self’ nor ‘others’ are aware of. This idea can be transformed 
within a PM context into self (project team cumulative knowledge) with known 
“knowns” and this model can be used to also classify uncertainty and can further be 
combined with the Cynefyn framework described by Snowden and Boone (2007). 
Figure 1 below presents a transformation of these ides with a project procurement 
context 
Figure 1 – A Johari Oriented Cynefyn Typology of Awareness 
The Cynefyn framework is helpful for leaders attempting to understand the nature of 
exposure to risk and uncertainty that their operating environment poses. Snowden and 
Boone (2007) see situations as being mainly ordered or unordered with a small zone of 
disorder—essentially an island of chaos. They recommend strategies to deal with 
apparent or perceived disorder by shifting perceptions through use of knowledge and 
perceptions that can be shared and re-framed so that the disorder slips back into either 
an ordered or unordered state. If the project objectives and methods are known and 
understood it is relatively simple to take effective action, using well established 
protocols and, as indicated in Quadrant 1, a traditional procurement approach may well 
suffice. Quadrant 2 describes complicated projects which may be effectively dealt with 
using traditional project procurement approaches as long as the client/project owner 
seeks and uses expert help to formulate scope, scale and performance expectations. 
Relationship based procurement strategies begin to appear more attractive when the PO 
is blind to potential problems in complex projects. In this situation a lot of mutual 
adjustment is required between the PO and project teams in facilitating clear scope, 
scale and performance expectations. This situation is suggested by Quadrant 3. 
Quadrant 4 illustrates a chaotic state where the environment is highly turbulent or 
circumstances and required knowledge are changing more quickly than can be 
formulated into medium term plans such that the response can only be reactive and 
therefore all team members, including the POR, must be focussed on action that moves 
the project completion forward.   
Figure 1 introduces general issues of complexity and complicatedness in terms of the 
need for the PO and NOP team to share knowledge, insights on the implications of 
prescribed (planned) actions, and performance expectations. It hints at the importance of 
mutual understanding of what is required, what needs to be done and how to resource 
and mobilise resources to achieve the intended project outcome, as well as the need to 
define performance expectations. From the PO’s perspective, performance may mean 
benefit realisation through the project outcome and this could encompass a number of 
stakeholders, such as end-users, as well as ‘the environment’. From a NOP’s 
perspective, performance may include financial rewards as well as intangible returns 
such as kudos, learning, relationship building and a range of other benefits. Figure 1 
provides a framework for understanding the need and project circumstance that could 
govern the degree of relational consideration that the project procurement form must 
encourage to be effective in facilitating clear enough scope, scale and performance 
expectations to enable the PO and the NOP project team to be able to deliver a 
successful project. Explicit articulation of performance in terms of delivering expected 
benefits is critical to achieve project success.   
2.3 Collaborative Forms of Project Delivery 
Collaborative forms of project procurement for a joint enterprise can vary significantly 
in their aims and objectives and the way they are established.  Table 1 illustrates some 
essential features. The selective collaborative form and their main objectives and 
motivations are presented along with illustrative examples. There are many examples to 
choose from so those included are chosen to illustrate the collaborative form and we 
acknowledge that readers may hold in mind other examples that they are more familiar 
with and can relate to more readily. 
Table 1 does not include detailed discussion of general business alliances (Doz and 
Hamel, 1998; Porter, 1998) or framework agreements (Khalfan and McDermot, 2006) 
and several other forms of collaborative supply chain agreements. Participants in 
general business alliances share some of the motivations of participants in project 
alliances but they do not share the same commitment to best-for-project because they 
have their own strategic intent drivers for their alliance creation and maintenance. 
Framework agreements are mechanisms where a set of players within a supply chain, 
perhaps those delivering capital works or maintenance, are pre-qualified and a service 
agreement with their clients for project delivery is arranged. These agreements are 
useful in local government, for example in providing smaller scale projects than the 
large infrastructure projects that are usually associated with project alliances. Service 
alliances also are becoming more common as a way to deliver programs of work in 
partnership with clients (such as utility providers, steel making companies and large 
hydrocarbon processing entities) where they work with clients, sometimes undertaking 
all maintenance and capital works or working alongside clients and their maintenance 
and capital works workforce. 
The subject of alliancing in general business terms has been well researched and written 
about. Classical books such as Doz and Hamel (1998) and articles by Porter (1998) 
provide a wealth of knowledge about how alliances are developed, their advantages and 
disadvantages and their nature as a way to conduct business. However, as numerous 
authors have pointed out (Abrahams and Cullen, 1998; Clayton Utz, 1998; Halman and 
Braks, 1999; Hutchinson and Gallagher, 2003; Walker and Hampson, 2003a), project 
alliances have distinct features as compared to the business alliances referred to by  Doz 
and Hamel (1998). There has also been some recent research work specifically on 
project alliances in the context of Australian infrastructure projects (Jeffries, Gameson 
and Chen, 2001; Cheung, Rowlinson, Jefferies and Lau, 2005; Davis, 2006; Walker and 
Rowlinson, 2008; Love, Mistry and Davis, 2010) and also for general building 
construction projects (Walker and Hampson, 2003b).  
Table 1 - Collaborative forms of project procurement  
*Note: Q = Quadrant. 
Collaborative 
form  
Objectives Illustrative examples 
Joint venture 
(JV) 
Figure 1
Q1*,  
possibly 
Q2? 
Several organisations form a co-
operative, possibly as a separate 
company to deliver projects. 
Joannes (2004) studied JVs in a Hong 
Kong construction context. 
Arroyo (2009) studied a number of JVs 
formed in a Latin American logistics 
business transformation context. 
Motivations Cost risk shifting, supply niche 
expertise, access credibility 
through a partner’s brand image, 
gain local tacit knowledge, gain 
advanced knowledge transfer 
 Even large organisations need to spread 
risk to their balance sheet commitments; 
 Smaller firms grow a reputation through 
association with a major player; 
 Smaller niche skill operators supply rare 
skill resources; 
 Local firms supply access to local tacit 
knowledge and access to social capital; 
 JV partners seek to learn from each other.
Partnering 
Figure 1
Q1, Q2, Q3 
The lead contractor and a series 
of sub-contractors and/or 
suppliers formally agree to 
achieve mutual project objectives 
through pre-defined behaviours. 
Eriksson (2010) provides a highly current 
literature review and finds from Swedish 
case studies. 
Motivations To reduce potential conflict 
through a formal partnering 
charter. 
 Establishing protocols for dispute 
resolution and enhancing perspective 
understanding; 
 Use of collaborative tools and operable 
technologies; 
 Enhancing trust and commitment; 
 Delivering innovation and improved 
decision making through early and more 
fully integrated involvement at the front-
end of projects; 
 Improving communication and 
deliverable quality through excellent 
coordination. 
Public Private 
Partnership 
(PPP), Private 
Finance 
Initiatives 
(PFIs),
Figure 1
Q1, Q2, Q3 
Build Own 
Operate 
Transfer 
(BOOT) 
family. 
Figure 1
Q1, Q2, Q3 
The broad objective for PPP and 
PFI is government to work with 
private industry to develop 
projects for government through 
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
that takes responsibility for the 
provision of a service through 
design, delivery and operation of 
a facility. 
The BOOT family form of this 
kind of procurement process can 
be applied to any client entity. 
BOOT usually has a fixed 
concession period to charge a fee 
for service until the facility is 
handed over to the government or 
client either for no charge or for a 
nominal sum. 
Smyth and Edkins (2007) provide a useful 
history of PPP/PFIs and insights into their 
application from a relationship based 
procurement perspective. Another useful 
set of examples is provided in the Akintoye 
et al. (2003) book. PPP/PFIs tend to be cost 
and risk shifting exercises where 
governments provide a service performance 
brief and key performance criteria and the 
private sector clients assume all risks in the 
long term for the assets. 
BOOT schemes were commonplace in the 
development of Hong Kong’s road 
transport infrastructure (Smith, 1999; Tam, 
1999) in particular but this has been a 
world wide trend. They are similar in the 
way that the provider assumes long term 
risk but some of these have been very 
lucrative where demand exceeds 
expectations or costs turn out less than 
expected. 
Motivations The initial PFI idea was to move 
the recorded liabilities away from 
appearing as government debt to 
be a third part service provision. 
This grew in scope, scale and 
sophistication to be a common 
way for the private sector to 
provide all kinds of erstwhile 
government provided social 
services such as hospitals, health 
services, prisons etc moving 
beyond transport infrastructure. 
Variants of this have been the 
BOOT family of arrangements as 
well as PPPs.  
 Converting and upgrading aging public 
infrastructure such as road, bridges, rail 
lines and associated facilities from public 
owned assets to privately financed 
vehicles to deliver fee-for-use services; 
 Expected efficiencies to be gained from 
private enterprise delivery rather than 
government bureaucracy who have a 
limited set of skills and expertise to 
produce these facilities in-house; 
 Expected innovation and improved 
whole-of-life project outcomes; 
 Both PPP/PFI and BOOT type schemes 
require extraordinary clustering of 
expertise because the ‘project’ involves 
not only providing a facility but also its 
maintenance over the concession period 
as well as associated service provision.    
Project 
alliance
agreement 
(PAA) 
Figure 1
possibly  
Q2, Q3,  
definitely  
Q4
Inappropriate 
for Q1 
Project alliance parties work as 
an integrated, collaborative team 
to make unanimous decisions on 
all key project delivery issues. 
The aim is create a ‘sink or 
swim’ together situation that is 
reinforced by group gainshare 
and painshare arrangements. 
PAAs may be developed through 
a single team developing the 
proposal or two teams with 
competing proposals of which 
one will be accepted. 
Department of Treasury and Finance 
Victoria (2010) provide a guidance 
document and definition slightly adapted as 
follows—A state agency (the Owner) 
works collaboratively with private sector 
parties (NOPs) to work together acting with 
integrity and making best-for-project 
decisions. 
Love, Davis and colleagues have also 
reported on Alliance case studies in 
Australasia (Love et al., 2010; Love, Davis, 
Chevis and Edwards, in press). 
Motivations The focus is on risk sharing so 
that all bear risk and reward as a 
group and not as individual 
firms. This is expected to deliver 
superior best-for-project results. 
The competitive PAA process is 
meant to either inject price 
competition into the process or to 
allow two different project 
solutions to be explored. 
 Select the best team for the project; 
 Integrate the client (owner) with NOPs to 
provide finer tuned communication 
channels; 
 Develop clear commercial and 
transparent arrangements for an agreed 
and stable target outturn cost (TOC) and 
fee structure for NOPs; 
 Work within a no-blame, authentic risk-
sharing, innovative and committed 
culture.  
When we study the motivations for developing the range of collaborative procurement 
of projects illustrated in Table 1 it becomes clear that each of the four types illustrated 
requires extensive flexibility of knowledge exchange and interactive collaboration 
between the PO and NOP. 
The JV examples provided indicate that an important role of a JV is for knowledge 
transfer. The Joannes (2004) study had significant focus on how local Hong Kong sub-
contractors and JV contractor partners shared local knowledge that was particularly 
learning oriented so that a vital skill needed of partners was that of knowledge transfer 
and collaboration (Walker and Johannes, 2003). This was also evident in the cases cited 
in the Arroyo (2009) study and, in particular, one case study that was discussed in some 
depth about how parties came together to collaborate with needs for resource sharing 
and access to local tacit knowledge of the variable river system conditions in South 
America (Arroyo and Walker, 2008). The above examples indicate how knowledge 
sharing and collaboration by NOPs was strong at the project delivery stage. The PO and 
POR gain little relational advantage unless they believe that the JV provides a superior 
set of combined skills to that which would be the case for an individual contractor.  
The partnering examples in Table 1 highlight the need for collaborative skills. 
Additionally, trust building and higher levels of communication and dialogue are 
required to facilitate innovation. This is also true for project alliancing but Table 1 hints 
at the additional relationship skills and attributes required of the contractor because of 
the greater intensity of working more closely with the client at the front-end of projects 
through early involvement in the brief development and refinement and exploration of 
various options and alternatives that may be applied. Quadrants 1, 2 and 3 of Figure 1 
could be suited to partnering. While it is useful for complex and complicated project 
contexts, Quadrant 4 would require measures to be taken that may prove to be against 
the partnered firm’s individual interest and so total commitment may well be not 
feasible. Best-for-project would need to align with the partnered firms’ interests due to 
obligations of each firm’s investors overriding that of the project.  
PPP/PFIs and BOOT type projects also require excellence in communication and 
collaboration across the wide range of project partners that form the syndicate to deliver 
the project and ongoing service over the concession life of the asset. Quadrants 1, 2 and 
3 can be accommodated by this procurement choice. This approach affords many 
opportunities for collaboration and constructive engagement, especially on the life cycle 
view of such projects. However, as with the JV and partnering approaches, that final 
best-for-project priority is subsumed by recognition that PPPs/BOOT family projects 
have their agendas set by the PO for the benefit of the PO and so it is unlikely that a 
best-for-project priority over all else can be sustained. 
This paper is focussed on project alliances and there is an additional set of 
characteristics that require even more finely honed skills than those needed for JVs or 
for PPP/PFI or BOOT projects. As noted in Table 1, a defining difference with project 
alliances is the need for project participants, the PORs and NOPs, to work 
collaboratively in the brief development and TOC development stage on a best-for-
project top priority and so this requires even higher levels of attributes of trust and 
commitment. 
2.4 The Antecedents to Collaboration, Trust and Commitment 
Collaboration requires high levels of trust and commitment, especially in temporary 
organisations and those where members may be dispersed geographically (Jarvenpaa 
and Leidner, 1999). Collaboration is particularly stressed by the Department of Finance 
and Treasury, Victoria, as a vital requirement for alliances (2006; 2010). Therefore, the 
meaning of trust and commitment must be defined and explained so that the required 
project alliance ambience can be better understood.  
Trust has been modelled as having three principle elements: ability, benevolence and 
integrity (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995). Ability refers to the capacity to do what 
is promised and this capacity is needed at the individual level so that people have the 
skills and motivation to do what they say they will do. It is also needed at the 
institutional level so that organisations interacting within the project do not present 
barriers that interfere with people doing what they are able to do. Bureaucracy, poor 
resourcing or a range of other organisational climate aspects can affect an individual’s 
ability to do what they are capable of. Benevolence relates to individuals having feelings 
of support and desire to help rather than hinder …?. Integrity relates to ‘walking the 
talk’; being credible and being honest so that if a commitment is made then the person 
will move heaven and earth to do what they promised. These elements define trust 
levels. 
Commitment can operate at three levels: continuance, normative and affective. Meyer 
(Meyer and Allen, 1991; Meyer, Becker and Vandenberghe, 2004) argues that we can 
be committed at a continuance level; that is, do something to continue receiving 
benefits or advantages. Commitment may also be given at a normative level where a 
sense of duty, obligation or habit drives action or at an affective level where the person 
truly wants to do something, not only for the reward or out of a sense of duty, but out of 
a genuine desire to do so. In alliancing and partnering workshops and other devices are 
used to build affective commitment through helping people align their goals with those 
of the organisation seeking their commitment, so that all people are strongly motivated 
to achieve the same outcomes. 
This section helps us answer our question  from a theoretical perspective. The main 
difference between an alliance and other relationship forms in the cited literature 
outlined in Table 1 relates to alignment being centred on a best-for-project, as opposed 
to corporate or individual member organisation, motivation. Participants (or 
organisations) within JVs and partnering arrangements primarily look after their own 
interest. If all participants’ interests happen to be aligned then it is convenient but 
alignment of objectives is not specifically designed to be mutually aligned in that way. 
In PPPs and BOOT type schemes there is an engineered what? in longer term interest 
for a whole-of-life efficiency of the project artefact, but the procurement form remains 
competitive and commercial. Typically, perhaps three or four but almost always more 
than two, consortia bid for the concession and the client (public or private) remains 
independent of the consortia in terms of active participation and is not part of the 
development of the project solution. Thus it is radically different from a project alliance 
where the client often central to developing a project solution and continually engages 
in project decision making throughout the project delivery. Project alliancing is a 
particularly intense form of collaboration. 
2.5 Intense Collaboration - Project Alliancing 
Several types of project alliance have evolved from the original alliancing concept. In a 
review of the alliancing literature during the close of the last decade, Walker and 
Hampson (2003a) cite the Wandoo Offshore Oil Platform (KPMG, 1998; ACA, 1999) 
and the Andrew Drilling Platform in the North Sea UK as examples of early origins of 
the alliancing concept. These related to Oil and Gas projects where several main 
contractors in a restricted supply chain could coalesce and form a cohesive design and 
implementation decision making group to work with the client/project owner in a new 
way that capitalised on each team’s tacit knowledge and expertise to a best-for-project 
design and development solution that minimised waste, re-work and inefficiencies. This 
concept was seized upon by governments (as did the hydrocarbon and mineral 
processing industries). These POs could be characterised as sophisticated repeat 
customers who could benefit from sharing knowledge and risk to improve project 
design and delivery of their projects. Unlike commercial alliances described by Doz and 
Hamel (1998) where alliance motivations may include learning to later compete, project 
alliances are more likely to be motivated by diverse specialists learning from each other 
how to best design and assemble project solutions or from companion competitors that 
share project risk as alliance partners to better manage scope and complexity. This is a 
significant difference to many business alliances. The Johannes (2004) study indicated 
that JVs in Hong Kong, for example, may have delivered an element of competitors 
being brought together where one party may be dependent on the other but the alliances 
discussed in early studies (KPMG, 1998; ACA, 1999) suggest co-learning, collaboration 
and co-value generation through special combinations of specialised skills and 
experience. The type of alliance that we are concerned with tends to move intentions of 
market share gain aside in order to stress value contribution to a project outcome.  
In Figure 1 we illustrated complex and chaotic project environments/contexts in which 
it becomes clear that the POR is somewhat reliant on the goodwill and knowledge and 
expertise of NOPs to help translate a business case into a project brief that can be 
developed into a project design to deliver the anticipated project benefit. A critical 
degree of collaboration is required so that all parties understand the context, 
implications of actions and reactions as well as how the collaboration might be most 
effectively conducted so that all parties involved are satisfied with the outcome. This 
means that PORs need to understand the motives, drivers and inhibitors of NOPs and 
vice versa. There needs to be a co-learning process and co-generation of new 
knowledge that helps re-frame concepts and mental models from being ‘me-centric’ to 
being ‘we-centric’. Each party usually possesses a part of the knowledge and expertise 
puzzle and the job of a PA is to provide a means for those pieces of the puzzle to be 
tested and correctly assembled.  
A jigsaw puzzle may be an inadequate metaphor. The situation being faced by alliance 
parties is often turbulent and ground rules may change or better understanding of the 
context may result in re-framing the project purpose and objectives over time. A 
somewhat easily visualised infrastructure project (Quadrant 1,Figure 1) may frequently 
morph within the time dimension as dependencies change. An example of this can be 
drawn from a conversation we had with an experienced alliance manager at the Alliance 
Association of Australasia (AAA) 2010 National Convention in Sydney. He related how 
a highway project alliance that he had recently worked on facilitated changed operations 
design detailing and sequencing to focus on road sections and bridge ramps to improve 
project road-users’ safety during project delivery. Changes made to sequencing 
activities significantly reduced, indeed eliminated, the frequency of traffic collisions 
truck and car drivers caused by errors in judgement made when confronted with 
roadwork interruptions and temporary feeder lane diversions. The POR was able to 
change the priority of project delivery elements without fear of being presented with a 
claim for scheduled work plan disruption or for contractor reassigned resources. The 
contractors within the alliance were able to feed valuable on-the-ground real-time 
information into decision making about how to sequence diversions and temporary 
access routes and appreciated this key result area (KRA) priority as being part of 
‘project success’ and value for money (VfM) from a broader than time/cost/quality 
perspective. Through effective communication and collaboration, a best-for-project 
safety criterion could take precedence over scheduling and section delivery performance 
criteria for the required time that this change was warranted. In this example, the project 
performance objective was clear and jointly accepted and required changes to the 
project plan which were made seamlessly. How could this be achieved? How was the 
procurement choice structured to enable this? 
A project alliance, as indicated in Table 1, allowed the POR and NOPs to work together 
closely together as a single project entity (i.e., to collaborate fully) in defining scope, 
scale, methods and plans, priorities and performance measures. In traditional 
transactional procurement forms, a rigid legal and administrative framework links both 
parties into set obligations and accountabilities. These are inevitably imperfect and are 
subject to bargaining variations, disputation and energy being expended concerning the 
process of pursuing the goal of reconciling this paradox. This inherently incurs energy 
wastage, with efforts being directed towards viewing changes in priority and the basis 
for claims and reconciling disputes rather than to achieving a shared project deliverable 
vision. The purpose of an alliance is to develop shared vision and goals and to put in 
place a governance system that maximises fairness to all parties so that exploitation 
concerns are removed, or at least substantially reduced. It also allows some flexibility 
and leeway rather than objectives remaining rigid even when it becomes obvious that 
some flexibility can realise a better result. This often continual fine tuning of 
expectations to respond to environmental turbulence explains the need for those 
involved in alliances to be highly trustworthy, be perceived to have strong integrity, and 
to be reliable. This means in practice that strong or exceptional technical skills are 
needed of NOPs as a baseline. Essential supplementary behaviours include 
demonstrating trust, a commitment to a vision which is shared with the project owner, 
and integrity that is often manifested as a best-for-project culture. This concept can be 
described as a stewardship model of leadership (Davis et al., 1997). When the PA team 
achieve a close level of collaboration to the extent illustrated in the road project 
example cited above, it effectively allows the meshing of POR and NOPs into a single 
coherent entity. 
The Walker and Hampson (2003a) study of the National Museum of Australia (NMA) 
showed a significant shift in alliancing from more singular purpose outcomes, such as 
an oil platform or even a road infrastructure project, to a more participant-intensive 
situation of a building construction project and they claimed that the NMA was the first 
such building-project alliance in the world. The novelty of this approach is not so much 
evident from the fact that it was a building project (as opposed to an engineering 
infrastructure project) but that alliancing was chosen because of an extraordinarily tight 
delivery deadline and it being a highly stakeholder-complex project to deliver. This 
suggests a defining difference between alliances and PPP or partnering projects or even 
JVs. The difference as illustrated in Figure 1 is that complexity and chaos requires 
project delivery participants and the project owner to work out how to most effectively 
recognise, acknowledge, share and manage risk rather than merely rely on transferring 
risk. The necessity to deliver highly complex projects with many unknown risks and 
uncertainties demands radical procurement solutions. This serious and radical problem 
demands a unique solution that project alliancing can offer. As noted in the introduction 
to this paper, PAs are not a recent experiment but have been evolving for decades and 
they are not restricted to government or hydrocarbon industry clients. 
A defining feature of project alliances is the way that NOPs are selected. The 
Department of Finance and Treasury Victoria (2006; 2010) indicates two methods that 
have changed little from that described by Walker and Hampson (2003a) in the NMA 
study. The defining theoretical difference between project alliances and other 
relationship forms of procurement is that NOPs are selected on the basis of the value 
they offer in terms of expertise rather than bidding on lowest price. The process 
described by the literature cited above states that a request for proposal (RFP) is 
advertised and consortia of project teams form, proposing their best team available. As 
part of their response, they clearly document their expertise, experience and showcase 
their capabilities to work collaboratively in the alliance providing evidence in the form 
requested in the RFP. The POR undertakes a rigorous selection process that involves 
desktop comparison of the RFP responses against the selection criteria and this process 
generally reduces the pool considered to two or three proponents. These two or three 
consortia are then interviewed in a process that may take several days of intensive 
presentation and examination of capabilities. During this time, justification and 
verification of evidence supplied and workshop simulations and discussion of the 
project concept is undertaken so that the POR can gain a strong, fair and transparent 
appreciation of the ‘chemistry’ of working teams. It is very difficult during this phase 
for NOP teams to disguise any rhetoric versus reality gaps in their proposal. An in-
principle agreement is made and the PA agreement is formulated once a successful team 
is declared. This will include price elements such as the fees to be paid to cover the full 
cost of managing the alliance, salaries, on-costs all the items that in construction are 
usually referred to as ‘preliminaries’. It will also include an agreed fee to represent the 
‘normal profit’ which is then in effect quarantined as part of a pain and gain sharing 
incentivisation process in which agreed proportions of deduction against the profit pool 
or addition to that profit pool is calculated. Failure to meet agreed performance results 
in all PA parties sharing any  penalties and if innovations and smooth management 
results in cost savings then sharing of these forms an incentive to pull together to 
achieve objectives.  
Several important divergences from other types of relationship-based procurement 
forms are evident. First, the ‘profit’ is established from the ‘normal profit level’ of each 
NOP within the consortium. The NMA project, for example, provided for NOPs to 
allow probity consultants total free access to inspect their accounting records to 
ascertain the average margin achieved over the previous six years. This figure was then 
used as the ‘normal profit’ to be placed aside in the profit pool (Walker and Hampson, 
2003c). This means that different NOPs in the syndicate would each expect to gain their 
‘normal’ profit level for undertaking the project successfully and the actual profit 
margin variance between NOPs within an alliance is totally accepted.  
Second, the project cost is benchmarked against comparable reference projects similar 
to the way that Flyvberg and others (Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 
Rothengatter and Bruzelius, 2003) suggest should be undertaken on mega projects in 
determining a realistic project cost budget. The project cost is estimated and calculated 
after the successful team is selected and this is based on both design refinement, project 
planning and risk treatment agreement between NOPs and the POR. The outcome of 
this exercise is a target outturn cost which represents the best estimate given the state of 
design and risk management and planning that can be ascertained. The TOC is 
compared against reference projects by independent advisors to establish that the TOC 
is fair, achievable, and represents the best value for money for the project. This is a 
radical departure from other procurement forms. It assumes that if the best possible 
consortium of teams respects each other’s potential expertise and intellectual 
contribution within a shared decision making collegial atmosphere, then the most 
effective and best value solution will emerge.  
Third, values of transparency; open and robust governance, and a ‘swim-or-sink 
together’ attitude reinforce and underpin the concept and belief in the rationale for this 
approach. Innovations in design, approach and process are encouraged and many are 
manifested through the TOC process so that the PA agreement can be finalised after the 
TOC agreement phase, usually several months after the successful team have been 
appointed. This approach also assumes additional innovation being realised through 
project delivery to enable meeting not only agreed project PAA performance target 
KRAs and key performance indicators (KPIs) but that they will be exceeded. 
Exceptional outcomes results in incentives that can be share through the agreed 
gainsharing formula. Conversely, if the KPIs and KRAs are not met then a penalty will 
be levied against the profit pool within a painsharing arrangement. The gainsharing and 
painsharing formula is agreed upon in the PAA and is a critical part of the 
incentivisation of the PA concept. It must be also noted that the performance measures 
usually encompass non-cost value which reflect value that other, perhaps voiceless 
stakeholders, may perceive as part of value for money. Typically, project alliances are 
public sector projects so community and environmental KRAs are common. This triple 
bottom line (3BL) concept of value for money recognises the validity of commercial, 
social and environmental components of ‘success’.       
The concept of value, including VfM, in a PA is far more explicit, (and we argue more 
sophisticated) and can be flexibly re-framed by mutual agreement, than that for other 
forms of relationship-based procurement that share some characteristics of collaboration 
such as JVs, partnering or even PPPs. It locks in early involvement of NOPs with PORs 
through the PA workshops and PAA structure. This develops an acute shared 
understanding of each party’s aspirations, performance capabilities, world view and 
both strengths and limitations. This results in better shared understanding about the risk 
and uncertainty appetites of teams, interfaces and boundaries and roles and 
responsibilities. This level of mutual understanding opens up great possibilities for 
innovation and process improvement. 
A variant to the predominant single TOC process is the dual TOC process. This process 
is similar to the single TOC except that two competing alliance consortia compete on 
TOC options and the POR then selects one and pays a substantial contribution towards 
the cost of participation for the losing. The POR, according to Department of Finance 
and Treasury Victoria (2010), gains better VfM using a dual TOC approach. At the 
2010 AAA National Convention in Sydney a representative from Department of 
Finance and Treasury Victoria stated that governments were obliged to prove VfM 
through price competition. A dual TOC approach may also be triggered by investigation 
of quite different approaches to a brief by two consortia with the POR making a choice 
based on the perceived best solution proposed.   
The dual TOC approach has resulted in disquiet among many PA consortia. First, it is 
very expensive (in terms of time, energy and money) to commit to the TOC process if 
project involvement is not going to proceed even when some of the costs are 
reimbursed. Second, there are issues about equity in terms of quality of access to PORs 
and any favourable treatment of one alliance consortium over another hence a trust issue 
is involved. This undermining of trust may affect any later relationship. Third, in a dual 
TOC the POR may (and often does) take great ideas and innovation suggestions 
(intellectual property - IP) from the unsuccessful alliance consortium to be adapted by 
the successful alliance consortium creating a fear that this imbalance of the power of the 
POR will result in unfair loss of IP. The POR may well feel that because they pay a 
contribution towards the costs incurred by the unsuccessful alliance consortium they are 
entitled to use this type of IP. The level of trust and commitment may be degraded in 
this competitive alliance model. 
Two other related forms of project alliance are recently gaining popularity; these are 
early contractor involvement (ECI) and project planning alliances (PPAs).  
Alliance Association of Australasia (2010: p6) define ECI as a “process where the 
designer and constructor work together in a contractual relationship with the client, first 
to scope and price a projects (Stage 1) and then to design and construct a project (Stage 
2).” It is a fully open book approach involving independent estimating, probity and 
financial auditing to reduce or eliminate risks associated with a contractor setting the 
agenda to be the only possible delivery agent. This process may involve a single or dual 
ECI competitive form of interaction. Payments to the contractor are made on agreed 
time based rates and the result of stage 1 is a full analysis of risks and proposals of who 
would bear the risk and how risk will be managed as a risk-adjusted price (RAP) or 
risk-adjusted maximum price (RAMP). This has some evolutionary history with the 
concept of buildability or constructability consulting that was used in the 1990s (Francis 
and Sidwell, 1996; Sidwell and Mehertns, 1996; Griffiths and Sidwell, 1997) and came 
out of studies into partnering (CII, 1996). The main difference between ECI and 
constructability advice is that as well as undertaking review of design from a pragmatic 
buildability perspective or value engineering studies (Male, Kelly, Gronqvist and 
Graham, 2007), the study is even more front-end focussed in suggesting design schemes 
and evaluating risk and uncertainty at the very beginning of project schematic design 
phases in translating the project brief to a design concept. ECI also involves developing 
KRAs and KPIs which is outside the scope of buildability or constructability consulting. 
According to Alliance Association of Australasia (2010: p9) ECI is best use as a 
mezzanine step between full alliancing where there are large number unknown 
unknowns (Figure 1 Quadrant 4) and traditional contracting (Quadrant 1). ECI is able to 
be used where there are a number of known unknowns (see Figure 1 Quadrant 2) or 
other risk generating constraints, and they may be significant, but the situation is clearer 
than that which triggers the need for a PA solution.   
The second form of PA that has recently emerged, similar in many ways to ECI, is a 
project planning alliance (PPA). This is a progressive alliance form in which a rare set 
of skills are brought in with the POR very early on in a project at the early planning 
stages. An example of this presented at the 2010 Alliancing Association of Australasia 
National Convention in Sydney. This approach was particularly valuable in developing 
project proposals for infrastructure which may be particularly vulnerable to local 
stakeholder action groups, where there are particular highly sensitive environmental 
issues that can derail the project development process, where there may be highly 
complex land title issues to resolve and other complex uncertainties surrounding route 
choice of roadways, pipeline or power lines for example. In such situations, having a 
specialised alliance of planning-related consultants in addition to a contractor combined 
with a sophisticated and knowledgeable client can allow more project solution options 
to be considered as well as a greater quality of the depth of analysis of risk and 
uncertainty and for innovative technical solutions to be considered. This may also be 
appropriate for large scale refurbishment projects or relocation of assets such as 
hospitals, prisons and other facilities where people are to be decanted and relocated and 
where this process requires complex interface and knock-on implications to be analysed 
in great depth. The whole process of deciding on ‘what to decide upon’ can be a major 
project involving a large number of skilled participants who need to be part of a 
problem solving exercise that requires an alliance of skills and experience.   
We have spent a great deal of time and devoted much space to explaining forms of 
project alliance in this section so that readers can appreciate the subtle difference 
between them and other relational forms such as partnering, JVs and even PPPs where 
the client/POR involvement is more as a background party rather than for alliances 
where the client/POR is an active and vigorous participant in a collaborative joint 
problem solving exercise.  
2.6 Theoretical Defining Differences Relating to Project Alliancing 
We are now in a position to offer propositions about differences between PAs and other 
relational-based procurement forms discussed. Table 1 and Figure 1 provide a 
theoretical basis to answer our research question. We can hypothesise that the defining 
differences between an alliance and other forms of relationship procurement are: 
1. The PO and POR are central components of the alliance team. They must 
actively work with the NOPs to develop a project solution. This occurs whether 
the PA has one or more competing consortia; 
2. PAs are most suitable for projects characterised by an unusual level of 
complexity (Quadrant 4 in Figure 1) so that unimpeded knowledge transfer and 
shared decision making is necessary from interpretation of the project brief 
through to the project realisation plan;  
3. The POR demands as part of the essence of the alliance that there be an open, 
honest, collegiate and accountable approach to decision making—again we see 
the centrality of the POR and a best-for-project focus by pursuing common and 
coordinated goals; and 
4. The alliance forms a collective in which all parties participate in sharing risks 
and rewards so that one participant can not take advantage of or over others.  
Additionally the Victorian government’s paper provides additional obvious differences 
(Department of Treasury and Finance Victoria, 2010: p20) : 
5. Participants agree not to litigate in respect of the performance of the works, with 
limited exceptions (including a breach of the relevant behavioural 
‘commitments’);  
6. Participants agree to a fee based on past profit performance that is transparently 
audited plus the management cost of delivering the project rather than through a 
competitive fee bidding process; and 
7. Participants commit to an ‘open book’ arrangement and have broad mutual 
access and audit rights to each other’s documentation. 
This establishes a testable starting point for understanding an alliance ambience that 
will now be explored further illustrated by quotes and analysis from the study we 
undertook.
3 The Research Study Context 
The Alliance Association of Australasia commissioned the authors to undertake a study 
to profile professional excellence in alliance management. This is part of a series of 
research projects undertaken within Australasia on alliancing that has been undertaken 
by a number of research groups over several years. In this study 10 AMs and 2 unit 
managers who alliance managers report to were interviewed with one of the AMs also 
being a unit manager. We requested a list of approximately 15-20 potential interview 
candidates who had been alliance managers on one or more projects as well as having 
been experienced project managers in other environments. The group was made up of 
approximately 33% each relatively inexperienced AMs, experienced AMs and those 
with experience of multiple alliances. Each interview was recorded and transcribed. 
Interviews took just over one hour on average involving 13 hours of recording and over 
200 pages of transcript which was analysed. Table 2 illustrates the profile of 
interviewees.  
Table 2 – Profile of Interviewees 
Alliance project managers and leaders 
interviewed (including 1 program 
manager) 
10
Experience in alliancing 1.5 – 5 years 
Unit managers interviewed 3 
Number of employing organisations  5 
Organisations’ level of involvement in 
alliancing 
Varied, up to 75% of income generated through alliances. 
Alliancing had become the dominant procurement method for 
all participant organisations. 
Nature of alliances 1 Building construction project alliance (PA), 9 infrastructure 
development and maintenance services PAs.  
We used a grounded theory approach to analyse the data following a process where we 
individually ‘coded’ data to make sense of the responses to questions asked, using the 
transcripts and sound files as our reference along with our knowledge of the literature 
from the literature review. Both researchers coded the data separately, then discussed 
and agreed upon the codes arrived at using the approach prescribed by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). We used NVivo, which is a sophisticated software tool for managing 
qualitative research data. We were able to access the sound files, transcriptions, other 
relevant data such as project reports, web based information and less formal 
correspondence such as sundry emails. NVivo can be used as a form of document copier 
and tagging facility. The researcher reads transcripts and listens to the interview records 
and codes for meaning of emerging category themes and sub-category sub-themes. 
These are then built into more encompassing category entities in a continuous 
sensemaking exercise. The process is akin to factor analysis in quantitative data 
analysis. The number of interviews chosen is based on achieving data saturation so that 
each new interview reveals fewer ‘new’ categories/themes so that further interviewing 
achieves significantly diminishing returns for effort involved. Two researchers 
undertook separate thematic analysis and compared notes to agree and explore 
disagreed interpretations. This is a well established approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) 
and requires an open minded researcher with sense being made of the data through 
triangulation by referring to other data sources, such as documents, web sites or by 
presenting findings to respondents or others who could have been respondents for 
feedback and comment. This approach is highly opinion-based, meaning there is always 
a danger of bias through group think or in taking short cuts in analysing the large 
numbers of transcript pages such as occurred in this study. This required that care be 
taken to rigorously test emerging assumptions, findings and to seek confirmation or 
challenge from the literature. While this is a time consuming and absorbing approach it 
has the advantage of deeply immersing researchers into the subject matter content. 
Sound files reveal tone and expression and being the interviewer, as was the case with 
this research, allows researchers to read body language and take contextual notes that 
would be absent from merely studying transcript texts.  
The background of researchers is also a factor in the research process. In this case one 
researcher was an experienced professional with direct PM experience in similar 
projects and had studies both alliance and more traditional construction projects over a 
period of several decades. The second researcher is considered a highly expert 
professional in human resource management including sound knowledge of 
organisational behaviour and general management and has been involved with this 
professional area for several decades. In this way we were able to better understand the 
nuances and jargon that respondents provided and we were able to seek clarification of 
ambiguous or unexpected comments and to closely engage with respondents at their 
comfort level. We guarded against bias and our own assumptions dominating threads of 
discussion and so we encouraged free rein on the discussion within a broad interview 
semi-structured protocol that could allow us to prompt where necessary. We prompted 
questions about what it felt like to be in the alliance so that we could gain insights from 
bursts of enthusiastic voice levels, evasion or reticence or other forms of emotions.      
4 Discussion of Data and Results 
After carefully coding the data three main categories emerged. Table 3 provides these 
and their sub-categories. These help explain the ambience of the alliance and are 
explained with supporting quotations cited by interviewed respondents.  
Table 3 - High Level Synthesis of the Empirical Data into Categories 
Category Sub-category 
1. Espoused culture 
demonstrated through 
rules, expectations of 
alliance (PAA) 
1.1   PA culture (demonstrated through behaviour and attitude) 
1.2   PA governance 
1.3  PA game-breaking innovation 
1.4  PA trust capacity 
1.5  PA triple bottom line (3BL) aspirations 
2 Culture in use 2.1  Drivers of culture 
2.2  Enablers of culture 
Data falling into the high level category ‘Espoused culture demonstrated through rules, 
expectations of alliance (PAA)’ were able to be further segregated into sub-categories. 
These five sub-categories are: the PA culture; the PA Governance; PA Game breaking 
innovation; PA trust capacity; and PA triple bottom line (3BL) aspirations.  In the 
second high level category, ‘Culture in use’, data were segregated into two sub-
categories: Drivers of culture and Enablers of culture. 
Other categories and sub categories have been identified. The report that this paper is 
drawn from is far too detailed to fully discuss within the limitations of a conference or 
journal paper. Fuller detail can be found in the report presented to the AAA (Walker 
and Lloyd-Walker, 2010). We now examine each of the sub-categories in Table 3 with a 
brief discussion for each that helps us better understand differences between PAs and 
other relationship-based procurement approaches discussed earlier, and provide a few 
representative participant interviewees’ quotes to demonstrate how this first category 
and its sub-categories were arrived at. Space limitations restrict the number of 
quotations presented here, however, we have taken care to provide quotations which 
convey the ambience to the extent we can effectively do within this paper. We also 
present a series of selected quotes from the 200+ pages of transcripts to illustrate points 
made specifically about the PAs. These are linked to the Table 3 relevant sub-category. 
Table 3 – PA Sub-category Quotes 
Selected Illustrative Quotes (Note IV-nn = Interview number)
The PA Espoused Culture, Sub-Categories 1.1 to 1.5 (Note SC = Sub-category)
Quote 1IV-01 SC1.1 “... The basic assumption for alliancing is that you're all on the same team and if 
you can keep everybody on an even keel, then you'll end up with an excellent project. 
… agreements [PAs] are reached before you even start doing any work… that's the important part …. We 
had … a Project Alliance Agreement. We were all signatories to it. … So a lot of the problems that are 
normally associated with uncertainties within the contract had been thrashed out.” 
Quote 2 IV-10 SC1; SC 1.4 
 “… alliances are when it’s really unknown … But where you’ve got no idea, like when we’d go to XXX 
and we didn’t even know how we were going to get state and government approval, and we spent six 
months longer than what everyone expected to get that, and yet we still made our contract.  So you sit 
there and go “That’s an alliance,” absolutely and alliance.”  
Quote 3 IV-07 SC4; SC1.1 
 “The major differences are the contractural framework and the workshopping … the actual framework 
is aligned and then you workshop your people and your team to be aligned and have the single goal or 
the aligned goal.” 
Quote 4 IV-06 SC 1.2, 1.4, 1.1 
 “… we had four programs going out for selection … that involved the request for proposal going out to 
industry, them coming back in, doing it in short listing …  each consortium had about a 3.5 hour 
interview session with their team.  Prior to that we had guidance sessions, so if people were thinking of 
putting in an application, they could turn up and just ask us general questions about the RFP. Then they 
were interviewed.  From there we did a short listing process from the interviews, and then in most cases 
two were short listed, for one of the alliances …  Then each of those short-listees went through a two-day 
selection workshop, … turning up and doing various activities over two days, including dinner overnight.  
… following that selection workshop process, and that was largely about working together, 
understanding the alliances, those kinds of things.  … following on from that, each of the short-listees 
went through in two days, commercial negotiations, which was negotiating the margins, what was direct 
costs, what wasn’t inclusive direct costs.  out of all that, we did the number crunch to get the winner. 
… The commercial negotiation was less about a fixed project, and more about the principles of what 
we’d be including, direct costs and those kinds of things.” 
Quote 5 IV-01 SC 1.2, 1.1 
 “We’ve got a project control group that has within it a design endorsement which brings together people 
from the XXX, YYY, ZZZ [Note these 3 being the client and their government sponsor organisations] 
being the, our organisation and the design organisation and they add various milestones to that review, 
elements for design. 
… the idea of the co-location and bringing that all together, and that certainly does make all the 
difference.  We’re co-located with the people initiating the projects too, who are just a floor apart, and 
that’s been a huge part of improving that, generating the outcomes that everybody agrees on, we’re not 
dependent on a couple of meetings each month to talk about that, but people are just popping up and 
down and sorting out issues all the time. 
… The power of the team is the best for project outcome, whatever model of contract. You’ve got … more 
opportunity to do that in alliance contracts because you’ve got a more diverse team with a diverse 
culture and a broader agenda 
… On an Alliance, what we’re doing … is pricing the risk in a much more effective way, so that’s the 
costs the government the main risk is much, much lower under an Alliance model.  If we were delivering 
information under a PPP model, and risks like latent conditions, the consequence of dealing in an 
existing heritage building, getting heritage permits, getting planning permits, they are all things that you 
couldn’t manage in a bid phase and therefore, you’d have to allocate time contingency at the end cost 
contingency too 
Quote 6 IV-04 SC 1.2, 1.4, 1.5 
 “… alliancing is preferable to me because it puts me in a better position to … resolve all of the risks 
around the project delivery rather than just some  … It also allows me and the client to understand these 
other drivers and agendas and pushes those agendas aside to some extent, to give better control over 
outcome 
    …  I don’t subscribe to the theory that alliancing is better because it’s a relationship style contract, 
because you can make any contract delivery method a relationship style contract [through] the risk 
allocation. 
  …  You get through the hard times and get to the good times, … if it was a design construct and you 
were in an adversarial environment,  you’d come to a hard time and then the hard times just get harder 
and you’d end up in  court.  … in an alliance, you said at the very start, “We won’t end up in court, and 
what’s more, we’ve got a deciding body that sits there and will decide on everything that goes on here if 
there’s disagreement, called the Alliance Leadership Team.”   
 ...  And … about how [to] measure the success of an alliance … for me – and this is something you don’t 
normally measure in other contract delivery methods, you look back and you say how good were the 
trusting relationships on that contract?  …That is the basis of it all. If you don’t have trust in 
relationships, you don’t have an alliance.” 
Quote 7 IV-06 SC1.2  
“Certainly, in an alliance, having all the components of that price transparency, and having that 
challenge around different components of the prices, and having the risks really obvious, is a very 
different space.  …  The alliance brings that level of transparency to it.” 
Quote 8 IV-07 SC 1.3, 1.1 
“In terms of the team … we were up to about 250 innovations so far I think on this project and we’ve 
been really pleased with the way we’ve been able to innovate during the bid stage and we’ve continued 
that innovation through  … [and]after the TOC process. Obviously the more you innovate, the less 
opportunity later on to innovate because you’re sort of getting into the building phase. So some of the 
size of those innovations may have changed but the whole process continues on and the nett effect of them 
is very promising. 
[on aligned project values] … And that is precisely the values and behaviour, the natural values and 
behaviours that we’re trying to drive through to the team. So that’s the really pleasant thing to be aligned 
on that as well, not just the commercial side. 
The PA Culture In-use Sub-categories 2.1 to 2.2
Quote 9 IV-01SC 2.1 
“Even though [the POR] has always had a real passion for Alliancing … and he’s a champion of it, he 
likes it as a delivery method.  This is the first time he’s been able to get a project under that model and 
that is his organisation probably still struggles to have the model work effectively because there is still a 
need for them to exercise a lot of control over the project finances and they want to exercise a lot of 
control over government stakeholders and they also want to find some relevance on the job as well, as a 
delivery agency, traditionally they would find themselves in a role of bringing together all the component 
parts of the team and managing that team.  So for them culturally it’s a big shift as well.   
Quote 10 IV-06 SC 2.1 
 “The alliance model definitely requires more negotiation and more big-picture thinking.  … if there’s an 
issue with design when you’re coming through the process, then that’s working together and negotiating 
things is a different environment, to if you have an external design that’s coming in, then you get part 
way through construction and then you’re arguing about variances and those kinds of things.  So it’s 
probably that no blame, no disputes kind of atmosphere is quite different.  I guess with alliances, it’s less 
hard-nosed, but it’s that kind of firm but fair kind of environment.” 
Quote 11 IV-10 4 SC 2.1 
 “… [Government Treasury and Finance staff] don’t trust alliances and think that they’re soft, and make 
too much money for the contractor, and it’s not competitive and therefore it is the wrong vehicle.  So now 
they’ve turned them into what they call competitive TOC... 
Quote 12 IV-01 SC 2.2 
“some … loved  [the team environment], once they got to … sitting with the client and … with the 
designers, that was when it actually clicked for our site manager, he came out of the first selection 
workshop and said, now I get it, now I understand it, what this is about. When we were only the builder in 
a room with our own co-facilitator, everybody was the same and everybody had the same background for 
the most part.  But once we got into a room with people from very diverse backgrounds and different 
needs, they could see the benefit of working in that way and it was fantastic for them to reach that point 
and he is probably one of the most valuable team members now. He took a very direct style and he’s very 
forthright and he’ll take everything black and white for him and people respect of a site manager, but 
now he’s got sort of respect for other people on the team as well. 
Quote 13 IV-05 SC 2.2 
 “… I find working in a collaborative arrangement a lot more satisfying and we’re very fortunate … that 
XXX’s very progressive in their thinking. Thinking from a YYY background, they certainly want to work 
together to be able to derive the best value.  Doing that means that everyone’s pulling in the same 
direction, there’s I suppose, freedom to express yourself so what we call “non-discussable” – being able 
to have those open and honest conversations which fleshes out any issues out there and is able to 
ultimately take us to what we believe is the next level. 
Quote 14 IV-08 SC 2.2 
 “… the sort of people in an alliance that you look for are those that enjoy diversity, so the phases that 
you go through in an alliance are very rapid, and clearly the up side is whether it be through your senior 
management team, or the members of the wider project team, they get exposed to a huge end-to-end 
existence that you probably may not get in a corporate environment because you live in that department, 
and you’re not on site, or your not exposed to the next step.  So you’ll get a slice in a corporate 
environment, whereas it’s a bit like a micro lab, isn’t it?  … it’s a micro environment where, particularly 
for designers, and estimators, and people that perhaps didn’t get exposed to construction, or they didn’t 
get exposed to commissioning, or whatever, it’s very easy for them to put their hand up, show initiative, 
stay on and get exposed to things, look out the window, touch and feel things which they’d never ever had 
that chance to do in a corporate environment.  So in that way their skills are more broadened, they’ve got 
a much better perspective on how things happen. 
Quote 15 IV-01 SC 2.2 
 [on recruiting team members as potential AMs] “… our experience preparing for this project was really 
interesting as we chose foremen and site managers …  that we thought would be really effective … guys 
that were you know, grey hair done a lot of that sort of work.  We knew that they didn’t have Alliance 
experience; we knew some of them would struggle with it.  We had a pool of 10 of them at the start of the 
workshop process, by the time we got to the end of the workshop process, probably only half of them were 
ever going to get there and some of them took the whole length of the nine months workshop and bid 
process before it finally clicked and they realised, yes, I get it now, and I reckon I can live with that.  … 
there’s two lessons there; … it can take people a long time before they actually get what the differences 
are and people would start off sometimes being negative about it and feel uncomfortable … because it’s 
just a different way of doing things. … we dedicate a lot of time to the bid, and it meant that we were 
actually able to test that team and determine who was up for it and who wasn’t.  If you tried to compress 
the bid timeframe it might be harder to do that 
… So you’ll often win a project on the basis of good technical competency and the thing I like about 
Alliancing is that the client actually sees the way you are as a person and determines whether or not they 
think they’d be happy to work with you before they sign you up…  that’s a really strong attribute and 
delivery method.  The way the workshop is facilitated and set up and that was done really well on this 
project, was giving you the technical problems to solve, you have to demonstrate that you got the 
technical capacity to do it, but you have to do it in a way that we’re going to include them and show that 
you have the capacity to bring everybody to the table to solve the problem. 
Quote 16 IV-02 SC2.2 
 “There's less conflict. An ability to add a lot of extra value to the project without being stymied by 
preconceived limits, expectations and that sort of thing. I'm currently on another alliance right now but 
as a project manager not as an alliance manager, but I'm within the XXX alliance which is a major 
program of works and they've asked me to be project manager on a particular large portion of the 
project. I'm enjoying it. I'm working within a team who is focussed on best of project outcomes. I know 
that's a hackneyed term but it is basically the whole crux of the matter. The whole idea of an alliance is to 
come out with something that is best for the project. I'm quite happy to be associated and quite frankly do 
not really look forward to going back to a D&C type situation because it takes too much energy. 
… We had a uniform. We had PAA shirts; PAA hats. I allowed people to use individual company 
stationery. Perhaps I wasn't tough enough on that. I think if you can encourage people to accept the 
uniform and be part of the team by being able to recognise them as being part of the team, then that's a 
better outcome. 
… In this particular case we adopted the client's email system and it worked quite successfully. They 
supplied all the IT and computers. It meant we were totally common within the project.  
[on living with alliance AND base company cultures].. I found that the people that were more or less 
screened as being suitable to work on an alliance, the screening process was fairly significant and had a 
big bearing on the suitability of the people that came into the alliance as part of the alliance team. 
Initially on the clients side, we had a great relationship with the people that were working with us from 
the clients point of view but there were changes within the organisation over a period of time and the new 
people that came in had not gone through the process of the being aligned, for want of a better term and 
there was significant setbacks in the early stages of those relationships before we got back on track 
again. So it was a problem more from the client’s side than it was from the contractor side.” 
Table 3 provides a high level synthesis of the study results. Three broad categories 
emerged, all of which can then be broken in to sub-categories. We have examined in 
detail in this paper the first two broad categories only - the Espoused PA Culture and 
Culture in use. As shown in Table 3, these broad categories are broken into five and two 
sub-categories, respectively. Quotes relating to broad category 1 reveal behaviours 
required of PA team participants and demonstrate how the espoused culture is 
developed and supported through rules and expectations of the alliance as defined in the 
PAA. The eight selected quotes illustrate the ambience of a PA compared to other 
procurement forms. Discussion of the PA culture in use category is expanded with a 
further eight quotes that illustrate the ambience of this aspect of alliancing. The third 
category, concerning how the PA changes base organisation strategy, relationship 
performance and ideas about business performance is not discussed in this paper as it 
does not specifically relate to differences between alliance projects and other forms of 
contract. The broad picture provided by these quotes begins to provide us with a better 
understanding of the point of departure from other relationship forms of project 
procurement presented in Table 1. We now draw these threads together in Table 4. 
Table 4 – Defining PA Differences Proposition Discussion 
Note: P = Proposition 
Propositions Discussion of conclusions Suggested implications 
P1 - The client POR is a central 
part of the alliance team with 
the NOPs to develop a 
project solution. 
Quotes 9, 11, 12, 16 
This appears a defining point of 
departure. Alliances of this type 
can only work with sophisticated 
POs and PORs who effectively 
communicate and fully engage 
with NOPs to reduce information 
and power asymmetries.  
POs must carefully select their 
PORs and must invest in 
organisational learning initiatives 
to be able to exchange knowledge 
on their perspectives. Cultural 
intelligence is also vital in the 
ability of PORs to clarify their 
understanding of value. 
P2 - PAs are most suitable for 
projects characterised by an 
unusual level of complexity 
so that unimpeded 
knowledge transfer and 
shared decision making is 
necessary from interpretation 
of the project brief through to 
the project realisation plan.  
Quotes 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 14, 
15
Uncertainty and ambiguity 
management and clarification of 
the meaning of value are better 
dealt with through the loose 
coupling of a PA rather than 
tightly coupled risk shifting 
strategies in other procurement 
forms. The more ‘messy’ or 
‘wicked’ the problems faced, the 
greater is the need for flexibility, 
improvisation and creative 
problem solving offered by PAs.  
High technical competence is a 
given in NOPs as well as the need 
for highly advanced versatility and 
pragmatic approaches to PM. 
Layered above this is the need for 
very high levels of ability to 
communicate, constructively listen 
and creatively engage and be able 
to be highly innovative. This 
places knowledge management 
and organisational learning as core 
competencies for both PORs and 
NOPs. 
P3 - The POR demands, as part Trust and affective commitment Whilst skills and attributes are 
of the essence of the alliance, 
that there be an open, honest, 
collegiate and accountable 
approach to decision 
making—again we see the 
centrality of the POR and a 
best-for-project focus by 
pursuing common and 
coordinated goals. 
Quotes 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 
13, 15 
in PAs are core elements of 
authentic leadership and 
followership. PA culture must 
reflect NOP openness, 
collegiality, ethical behaviour 
and honest expression of values 
to facilitate best-for-project 
decision making. 
critically important, these must be 
matched by consistent behaviours. 
Much of these features can not be 
‘learned’ through courses, ‘book 
learning’ and other more 
conveniently taught approaches. 
These behaviours need to be 
developed by NOPs and PORs 
through practice, role modelling, 
mentoring, and workshop 
simulations. 
P4 - The alliance forms a 
collective in which all parties 
participate in sharing risks 
and rewards so that one 
participant can not take 
advantage of or over others. 
Quotes 1, 5, 7, 8, 10 
The ‘we all sink or swim 
together’ philosophy is a 
defining departure point from 
other relationship-based 
procurement forms. The ration of 
gainshare and painshare needs to 
be clearly accepted by all project 
participants in the PA.  
The TCE balance here is that 
much money and energy saved 
through lower tendering and 
ongoing project administration 
costs is redeployed to building a 
culture of shared responsibility.   
P5 - Participants agree not to 
litigate in respect of the 
performance of the works, 
with limited exceptions 
(including a breach of the 
relevant behavioural 
‘commitments’).  
Quotes 1, 6, 10,11,13, 16 
PAs are unique in their explicit 
agreement to not engage in a 
blame game. The P4 proposition 
requires a paradigm shift in the 
nature of responsibility and 
obligation of all parties. 
Litigation is only permissible for 
criminal conduct or gross 
negligence.  
This releases energy away from 
defensive measures when 
problems arise to proactively 
dealing with challenges. Risks can 
be effectively managed by those 
best able to when and as needed. 
Knowledge and vital information 
can be more effectively shared. 
P6 - Participants agree to a fee 
based on past profit 
performance that is 
transparently audited plus 
the management cost of 
delivering the project 
rather than through a 
competitive fee bidding 
process. 
Quotes 4, 5, 6, 11 
The concept of respect for each 
party to make a realistic and 
suitable return for their skills and 
expertise is acknowledged. The 
means to do this allows an open 
and transparent process to 
overcome many of the agency 
theory fears of exploitation by 
any party. 
Removing the fear of exploitation 
and enshrining a guiding principle 
for fair return for NOPs allows 
them to focus on best-for-project 
decisions. The TCE for 
distribution of excess benefit is far 
more effectively managed when 
projects exceed expectations and 
to compensate POs if performance 
expectations are not realised. 
P7  - Participants commit to an 
‘open book’ arrangement 
and have broad mutual 
access and audit rights to 
each other’s 
documentation 
Quotes 4,7 
This provision is unheard of in 
most relationship-based 
approaches except for cost-plus 
procurement.   
This provision lowers transaction 
costs of contracts administration 
compared to other approaches as 
well as increases trust through 
transparency. 
It becomes evident that an additional skill set is required that extends what is expected 
of an alliance manager (AM) above that of being a project manager—given the high 
level of focus on collaboration, transparency, accountability, open culture of knowledge 
sharing and joint risk/reward absorption with an emphasis on trust, initiative, 
breakthrough innovation to achieve outstanding project outcomes and a set of outcomes 
that are well beyond the iron triangle of performance. It is worth noting here that several 
AMs did mention that over recent years their business has tended to move towards 75-
85% of their overall business taking place within PAAs. This business reality reinforces 
the need to better understand this project procurement form.  
The essential message conveyed about the espoused culture is that a PA Culture is very 
different from a business as usual project delivery approach and has substantial 
differences from other relational procurement delivery approaches. The focus on mutual 
obligations based on all parties sharing risk and reward to an agreed formula, the way 
that the alliances are established as well as the selection process and structure have a 
defining and critical focus on mutual motivation for project success. The way that all 
partners sink or swim together is a defining point of departure from other forms of 
project delivery as well as the project owners (through their representative) sharing risk 
and being truly engaged with NOPs. The process for selection and establishing the 
culture is highly pro-active. Quotes presented here and those in our data base clearly 
provide a wealth of insights into why this procurement form requires high levels of 
commitment and project owner engagement. This procurement form, therefore, is not 
suitable for inexperienced or naïve project clients initiators. It is also not suitable for 
inexperienced or naïve NOPs. Our data also strongly suggests that sophisticated well-
designed and well-considered governance structures had been put in place in the study’s 
PAs. Innovation that breaks out of the ‘norm’ for business-as-usual and other forms of 
relationship-based procurement approaches appears to be designed into this system. 
Trust between partners to enable the level of mutual dependence is pivotal as is clear 
from the data and analysis. Finally, and this may relate to the tendency for public sector 
projects to adopt this approach, a 3BL performance is high on the list of performance 
expectations. There may be a sharpening 3BL focus for alliances in the hydrocarbon 
project sector for offshore oil extraction projects after recent disasters in the Gulf of 
Mexico, West Australian coast, west coast of Africa and elsewhere. The likelihood of a 
carbon tax in the future for environmentally friendly performance may enhance the need 
for this sub-category focus.  
An important sub-text emerging from the data is the aim in PAs to reduce wasted 
energy through relying on reactive rather than proactive measures, wasted knowledge 
and information withheld to solve problems that benefit all. The underlying principle of 
this relates transaction cost theory as put forward in explaining the cost of decision 
making (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991). Classic 
front-end focus in PM theory argues that energy expended at the early stages of projects 
to explore options and contextual issues, plan systematically, communicate clearly, and 
explore likely cause-and-effect links requires less energy than handling disputes in the 
event of a poor outcome. The attraction of collaboration may be understood in 
Darwinian and TCE terms. Investing in developing a commitment to team objectives, 
and a willingness to resolve within the PA any issues that arise during the project, 
results in fewer resources being expended on retrospective battles. When a long term 
view is maintained, and the potential energy-sapping threat of global competition is 
considered, the main game appears to be business sustainability and not ephemeral 
gains on individual projects or even struggles within projects for small victories.   
5 Conclusions 
The principal aim and scope limitation of this paper was to provide an authoritative 
answer to the question “What are the defining differences between alliancing and other 
forms of collaborative project procurement?” 
We drew upon agency theory and TCE theory to help finesse differences between PAs 
and other relationship-based project procurement approaches. We also discussed the 
nature of trust and commitment as core values and how these are applied in PAs to 
define differences between PAs and other procurement forms. 
We presented Figure 1 as a means to understand how uncertainty forms a defining 
element of PAs and linked that to Table 1to explore collaborative forms of project 
procurement. We discussed PAs at length in Section 2.5 including newly emerging 
mezzanine forms such as ECI and project planning alliances.  Our theoretical and 
literature review efforts allowed us to propose seven propositions about how PAs differ 
from other relationship-based project procurement forms.  
In Section 3 and 4 we presented empirical evidence and support for our 7 propositions 
and chose 16 quotes from over 200 pages of transcripts gathered from interviews with 
12 AMs and UMs. These quotes were then used to illustrate how the 7 propositions 
could be explained and supported as well as highlighting suggested implications arising 
out of the study. 
Our broad study was designed to find out much more about PAs than is presented here. 
It is important for readers to first understand how a PA differs from other procurement 
forms. We also investigate the feeling or ambience of PAs as well as the specific skills, 
attributes and behaviours required of AMs in other papers and in our report  (Walker 
and Lloyd-Walker, 2010). Further analysis continues on our data from this study.  
We trust that this contributes to the reader’s understanding of this emerging and unusual 
project delivery approach that has become a valuable option within the Australasian 
region and is now gaining greater acceptance elsewhere in the world.    
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